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1 Introduction
The debate on globalization and its eﬀects has been with us since about the
last two decades. During this time, it has moved from what was regarded
as the most likely - either feared or welcomed - future scenarios and their
peculiar features, to the appraisal of various consequences - whether actually
related, or as a sheer outcome of speculation - on sometimes previously un-
foreseen realms. Not surprisingly, by now the term “globalization” itself has
come to refer to a variety of meanings according to the various domains where
its eﬀects are deemed to have taken place. Globalization hints at political,
ﬁnancial, cultural, industrial, informational, linguistic, social, legal eﬀects,
just to name some of them.
In what follows, I will mainly refer to economic globalization: the inte-
gration of national economies into the international economy through trade,
foreign direct investment, capital ﬂows, migration, and where a major role
is performed by information and communication through the spread of new
technologies (Bhagwati, 2004). To an economist, the very ﬁrst foreseeable
outcome of economic globalization implies a tendency to the advent of price
convergence everywhere, having taken into account the conversion from a
currency to another one according to the nominal exchange rate. The re-
moval of market segmentation due to a variety of possibly non competitive
conditions- whether assessed through partial equilibrium analyses (i.e. mar-
ket by market) or according to simple two-goods-two-factors-two countries
general equilibrium models - leads to the so-called “one price law” predicting
the same price for (homogeneous) goods, capital and labor in both coun-
tries. This is why an envisaged consequence of globalization was, on the one
hand, a more “uniform” world in terms of prices, and on the other hand, a
disturbing “race to the bottom” in terms of quality (the obvious reference is
to Gresham’s law according to which bad money drives out good money).
So, how does public administration, operating essentially on an extra-market
sphere, enter this picture?
The economic analysis of public administration2 developed by public
choice (Niskanen, 1971, 1994) focuses on self interest as the major charac-
teristic deﬁning the rational behavior for every economic agent, not only for
2Since public administration is identiﬁed as the management of government policies, in
the following sometimes public sector and public administration may be taken as synony-
mous.
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those active in the private sector. Proﬁts must be replaced with some other
maximand relevant for the public sector agents’ objective function. This is
done by the Public choice view (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962) asserting that
while politicians seek power through re-election, bureaucrats seek it by ex-
panding their inﬂuence and status. In both cases the public budget (taxes
and public expenditure) may be arranged and exploited towards unintended
ends. This rent seeking activity results in both actors playing a major role in
the public administration (i.e. politicians and bureaucrats) bound to hinder
optimal resource allocation, in a way similar to what happens to producers
operating on imperfect markets.
In addition, since the public administration provides its citizens with
mainly non-tradable services3, in a globalized world another source of inhi-
bition, thwarting an optimal resource allocation, arises through the Balassa-
Samuelson eﬀect, whereby diﬀerences in the relative productivity of the trad-
able and non-tradable sectors may coexist. Therefore, not only the law of
one price is prevented from being eﬀective across countries, but sometimes
even its milder version, i.e. price convergence, does not take place. Hence,
the area of optimal resource allocation is deemed to have to be expanded4 by
reducing the size of the public administration in terms of both output and
employment. For all these reasons, one may conclude that the more glob-
alization proceeds, the more the public sector is bound to recoil. Do they
really oppose each other?
This paper will address the complex relationship between globalization
and the public administration by focusing on a number of general concerns,
related to the economics of the public sector. All issues related to public
economics, in so far as they require governmental power, may be exacerbated
by globalization. The Italian experience, itself in turn placed within the
European Union, is taken as the observation point to exemplify the argument
by looking at the case of tertiary education.
3In addition, Baumol (1967) argues that governmental services are mainly provided
by means of labour intensive practices where labour saving technological progress - for
various reasons ranging from lack of investment to rent seeking inclinations – is very
slowly adopted.
4This view disregards the second best theory (Lipsey and Lancaster, 1956) according
to which when one or more optimality conditions cannot be satisﬁed the second optimum
solution may be found away from, rather than approaching, the ﬁrst best solution.
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2 The concerns
2.1 Dimension: is the size of government changing?
The early literature about the relationship between economic globalization
and the national state hints at “retreating shifts” in the quality and quantity
of state power and authority driven by the ever-increasing economic power
and strength of private ﬁrms (Strange, 1996). The process of globalization
is seen as a trend eventually leading to a “borderless world” (Ohmae, 1990)
where empowered non-governmental players emerge in the world order (Falk,
1997). The intensiﬁcation of “state-indiﬀerent” multinational corporations
would ultimately imply the irrelevance of the national states and elicit the
end of public administration with it (Stever, 1988).
As only market-established prices are reckoned to be optimal and fully
informative, and since the public sector, for its very nature, cannot either
implement or emulate market prices5, the way forward to re-establish eco-
nomic eﬃciency was envisaged in downsizing the government activity and so
reduce the need for public administration.
The statement “the era of big government is over” - pronounced by the
US president Clinton in 1996 - was widely endorsed by the public in many
states where the electorate voted accordingly. The policy “Starve the Beast”
(i.e. carry on tax cuts so to make public expenditure reduction inevitable
and eventually end up with a smaller government, the Beast being under-
stood as the Hobbesian Leviathan) seemed to need implementation almost
everywhere. The suggested policy for outﬂows was to reduce and possibly
eliminate as many lines as possible in the budget expenditure, while for in-
ﬂows it prescribed a major recourse to privatizations and to tax reductions.
This was done directly by means of explicit tax cuts and indirectly through
the many ways tax erosion could come about.6
5No allocation may be declared optimal (more precisely: the optimum cannot be de-
ﬁned) when some room is left for exemptions from the general rule of pricing at the
marginal private cost such as missing markets, externalities, public goods and the like.
6Economic globalisation, involving the free movement of goods and factors has indeed
changed the availability of the tax base. This is so, because the more a good is tradable,
the less taxes may be levied on it, due to competition reasons, analogously, the more
a factor is mobile, the less it may be taxed, lest it moves away from the place where
taxes are higher. A shift in tax composition has therefore occurred recently: less taxes
upon the more mobile capital, more taxes on the more immobile labour. Yet, more taxes
on labour translates into higher labour costs (or, wage reductions) which implies a less
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The minimal state (i.e. a government only protecting individuals from
coercion, fraud, theft and foreign aggression would only need police, judicial
and military personnel) was suggested to be the way ahead. All what could
be provided otherwise should be: therefore publicly provided health, educa-
tion, transport, utilities, pensions, trasfers and the like should be trimmed
down as much as possible and possibly soon, while the “competitive state”
was expected (and in some cases encouraged) to replace the welfare state
(Faramzand, 1999).
The economic analysis, on its part, addressed such issues like the associa-
tion between the kind of government and its size to ﬁnd that democracies are
more inclined to redistribution (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005) and so tend
to prefer a bigger government. The institutional choices were also put under
scrutiny to ﬁnd that a parliamentary government tends to approve a higher
government expenditure than a presidential government, and even that a
government elected through proportional representation tends to spend more
than when elected by majoritarianism (Persson and Tabellini, 2003).
A few years later, what do we observe? The power of the state might have
been eroded, but the weight of the state in terms of tax and expenditure does
not appear to have unquestionably done so. A quick look at the most recent
ﬁgures for the 27 countries of the European Union in Figure 1 tends to suggest
– with few exceptions - an overall stability rather than a clear downwards
trend.
Figure 2 presents a selection of countries, where the diﬀerent paths and
behaviors may be more clearly identiﬁed. On the revenue side, a small de-
crease in standard deviation testiﬁes a light reduction in many countries
which contrasts with increases in the UK, but across the 12 years under ex-
amination no country shows a monotonic trend. On the expenditure side,
the standard deviation falls by more than one percentage point and the pic-
ture is more dramatic showing some impressive reductions in Finland and
Denmark, and to a lesser extent also in Germany and in other states, while
the UK exhibits a substantial increase. Yet, one can hardly argue that the
picture may be perceived as representing a phenomenon “in retreat”, let alone
the foreseen end of public administration.
While such aggregated ﬁgures do not seem to depict a massive govern-
internationally competitive production and eventually more unemployment.
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Figure 1: The size of government in EU countries (1997-2008)
Source: Eurostat
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Figure 2: The size of government in selected EU countries
Source: Eurostat
8Elisabetta Croci Angelini / WP n.28 DiSSE, University of Macerata
ment downsizing, they still may mask a huge redistribution involving a shift
in the preferences for redistribution of the median voter, which is bound to
interfere with the characteristics of the typical taxpayer (Sinn, 2003), as well
as in that of the emblematic public expenditure beneﬁciary. Furthermore,
no proposition may be expressed about the cost-eﬀectiveness of any policies
pursued by the governments represented in those ﬁgures. Whether one ad-
heres to the view that the swelling in government size experienced in the 20th
century reﬂects a lack of safeguards apt to restrain government t power to
tax, or to the opposite view that praises government eﬀectiveness in acting
towards common interest, the most recent evidence does not unambiguously
support any imminent advent of the minimal state.
2.2 Tasks and eﬃciency of the public administration: how is the
role of government changing?
According to traditional economic theory, a public administration is neces-
sary to enable the public sector with the provision of public goods, which -
being deﬁned by such characteristics as non-rivalry7 and non-excludability8
- are unsuitable for proﬁt maximization (Samuleson, 1954). Such circum-
stances imply that, in the absence of suﬃcient incentives for the private sec-
tor, private production would end up with suboptimal produced quantities,
not enough to fulﬁll citizens’ requirements. Thus, in the simplest case9, the
government directly provides its citizens with public goods through bureau-
cracy and imposes taxes to ﬁnance them, while private goods are produced
by the ﬁrm and voluntarily paid through the price system.
The concept of public good unfortunately is sharper in abstract terms
than in its actual applications. A more widespread consensus exists about
the police, the army, the judiciary being pure public goods than for health,
education, and pensions. In addition, a closer examination to government
expenditure reveals that only a share of it responds to the above quoted
7Consumption is non rival if it can be expanded to an additional consumer at zero
marginal cost. The implications are that 1. By pricing the good at its marginal cost,
a zero price and thus no incentive to private production follow, and 2. Limiting the
consumption of a non rival good is undesirable.
8A non excludable good cannot be privately produced for making a proﬁt as proﬁts
cannot be (fully) appropriated by the producer. Preventing its consumption is more
expensive than letting it free.
9Less simple cases either refer to government indirectly providing public goods through
the private sector, or publicly providing private goods (e.g. through state ﬁrms).
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public good requirements. The Classiﬁcation Of Functions Of Government
(COFOG), developed by OECD and applied since 1999, counts 10 entries: 1.
General public services, 2. Defense, 3. Public order and safety, 4. Economic
aﬀairs, 5. Environmental protection, 6. Housing and community amenities,
7. Health, 8. Recreation, culture, and religion, 9. Education, and 10. Social
protection. These headings list both provision of public goods through state
bureaucracy and through purchases on the private market where production
is actually carried out: defense is an agreed upon public good, yet weapons
are often produced by private ﬁrms. So, how should the essence of a public
good be speciﬁed to seize correspondence between conceptual and concrete
matters? This question will not be answered here, but the issue about how
intermediate goods (weapons) relate to ﬁnal goods (defense) embodies one
crucial aspect towards the criteria for the evaluation of the eﬃciency of the
public sector. Another crucial aspect is the reach of the public good, i.e. for
whom a particular public good is relevant. Defense is relevant for the nation,
while a lighthouse is relevant for boats, irrespective of their nationality.
The speciﬁc nature of a given public good may, or may not, be such that
public provision must, could or does not, coincide with state provision. The
beneﬁts of local public goods (Tiebout, 1956) only accrue to a limited area,
while global public goods (Stiglitz, 1995) are beneﬁcial worldwide. For the
former, the solution to the core issues of public goods10 – “voting by feet” –
is easier than for the latter, for which there is no global public authority in
charge. The question about which government should provide global public
goods, whose scope, by deﬁnition, goes beyond the national boundaries, has
been answered by the “hegemony” literature (Keohane, 1984) and by stressing
the role of international cooperation (Kaul et al., 1999) as a substitute for
the lack of a global public authority.
The two aspects of the provision of public goods discussed above intersect
with innovation and technical progress, which have transferred a number of
formerly considered national public goods (again defense is a case in point,
10By reducing incentives to private production, free-riding also leaves open the ques-
tion about the optimal amount of public good to be provided, as well as whom should
be charged and by how much. For local public goods the solution proposed by Tiebout
is “voting by feet”. If perfect mobility across jurisdictions is allowed, the basket of pub-
lic goods supplied by each local government would be optimal in terms of amount and
payment. The problems posed by free riding would be circumvented as citizens would
reveal their preference by choosing the jurisdiction oﬀering precisely those public goods
they value most.
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but the list ranges from the ﬁght against contagious diseases to ﬁnancial
stability) to the international realm. What is analytically deﬁned a public
good may have to be delivered in a continuously changing dynamic environ-
ment where a state bureaucracy is unlikely to be particularly well suited to
incarnate the best solution. Indeed, the changing scope of national states’
sovereignty in a globalized world requires a re-deﬁnition of what exactly may
be regarded as a public good reasonably within the reach of the economic
and political dimension of the state. Still, as actual states’ dimensions diﬀer,
this issue is unlikely to obtain a general and straightforward answer.
A ﬁrst answer to the issues raised by national states increasingly void
of power has been a considerable resort to privatizations: the production of
goods and services, formerly provided by the state, has been shoved to the
private sector. Another answer seeks to try and attribute each task to the
appropriate level of government, and local public ﬁnance argument maintains
that, since populations diﬀer in tastes (due to age structure, customs, culture,
or else) it will never be optimal to provide the same kind and amount of public
good to everyone (Oates, 1972; 1999). When cross border spillovers cannot
be disregarded, but are even expected to increase due to technology and to
the changes in habits it usually brings about, the answer requires to ﬁnd
some ways so to enact a supra-level sort of government able to manage the
challenges posed by globalization (Kaul, et al. 2003).
2.3 Level and coordination: the role of subsidiarity
European integration may be considered a reduced scale globalization (Croci
Angelini, 2009) with an important qualiﬁcation: member states willingly
devolve shares of national sovereignty to a super-state entity which is deemed
to be able to perform the devolved tasks more eﬃciently. A basic feature of
a successful economic integration is its long term time span, which is needed
to build acquaintance, reputation, and understanding across member states
so to build up a wider cooperation.
In the European Union, the coordination among member states and the
coherence required across the actions undertaken by the various layers of its
multi-tier governance has led to the introduction of the term “subsidiarity”11
in the lexicon, and to a very frequent appeal to it in the policy practice.
11The term, introduced in 1992 by the Treaty on the European Union (aka Maastricht
Treaty), refers to the principle whereby government actions should be undertaken at the
lowest possible level and moved to a higher level only in presence of advantages that
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In fact, worries about a future re-nationalization of common policies have
sometimes been aired. On the contrary, the real issue is the under-provision
of a number of global public goods that might more eﬀectively be delivered
by the EU than by the member states. Unfortunately, they not always coin-
cide with the existing common policies, which are usually historically driven.
Common policies are not always accounted for in the common budget which
is for the most part spent under the common agricultural policy and the
cohesion policy. The former is especially far from being a typical example
of a global public good. On the contrary, monetary policy and the single
market may be regarded as global public goods in a framework where the
member states play the local and the EU the global role. One may also add
that peace is the ﬁrst and most important global public good delivered by
the EU, while the care for the environment is still lacking.
The need for horizontal and vertical coordination, so to assign the various
tasks at the most appropriate administrative level (be it the EU or any of
the NUTS12 levels), makes the judgement on the attribution a very complex
matter and the decision making across jurisdictions and administrative lev-
els quite intricate. The completion of the single market in the EU meant to
privilege the innovative mutual recognition over the traditional harmoniza-
tion procedure (Croci Angelini, 2005). Although the extensive application
of mutual recognition implies a privileged reliance in the market mechanism,
at the same time a much stronger emphasis was placed on EU, rather than
national, standardization, and (tentative) best practices.
In imperfect markets, where asymmetric information is pervasive, the
public authority also needs perform a guaranteeing role. “At the heart of the
eﬀective government lies the solution to a principal-agent problem between
citizens and government.” (Besley, 2006, p.2) This issue13 is usually scruti-
can only be reaped at that level. The principle has mainly being interpreted as the EU
refraining from embarking on actions in areas where individual member states’ actions are
suﬃcient.
12Through the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS) the EU Com-
mission developed a standard denoting member states (NUTS0) and their subdivisions
(NUTS1, 2 etc) which may or may not coincide with pre-existing administrative units:
regions, provinces etc. As the NUTS diﬀerent levels are employed for diﬀerent purposes,
in the end it makes some diﬀerence whether an institutional arrangement exists or the
(dis)aggregation reﬂects a pure statistical background.
13A principal-agent problem arises when complex tasks need accomplishment by the
agent, while, on the part of the principal, monitoring is very unsatisfactory.
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nized in reference to the willingness of an elected politician (the agent) to act
in the best interest of the voter (the principal) rather than - in the absence of
eﬀective monitoring - deliver political favors and pursue self-interested poli-
cies. Yet, another key aspect resides in the power of the public authority
to certify the quality of goods and services where the know-how contents is
critical and so information is imperfect, such as education, health and safety,
credit, and many other professional occupations. In such cases, the public
good delivered is quality certiﬁcation and it is almost always provided by
setting standards.
2.4 Standard and best practices: why and why not
Quality standards take away a signiﬁcant part of risk and so reduce some
costs. Still, they may help little in evaluating whether a standardized product
comes at the lowest possible cost. EU common standards may be employed
to assess the cost eﬀectiveness of a standardized product. It is increasingly
frequent the comparison of cost and quality content across member states
especially of public services, and in many cases best practices have been
identiﬁed and sometimes successfully exported. However, these issues cannot
always be sorted out in terms of best practices, and the least so, when pro-
cedures, best apt to deliver a good or service, are applied in another country,
but under diﬀerent circumstances. The variety of institutional forms char-
acterizing national countries usually have reasons behind them. The more
these elements matter, the less best practices can be meaningful. Therefore,
although EU best practices may be desirable, in some sphere of application
they might actually be impracticable.
One should understand ﬁrst, why a best practice is advocated at all and,
keeping away from easy recipes, distinguish whether or not the institutional
setting is compatible with the recommended solution. Therefore, best prac-
tices should be embraced when eﬃciency can be enhanced by simple changes
(e.g. re-organization of tasks), when optimization can be pursued in a lim-
ited sphere (e.g. standardization of rails and roads width), when technology
matters (e.g. energy saving devices). On the contrary, local solutions should
be preferred when diﬀerent institutional arrangements reﬂect diﬀerent social
preferences, (e.g. diﬀerent points along the alleged trade-oﬀ between eq-
uity versus eﬃciency) and in general “’best practices’ are an unhelpful way
to think about institutional reform” (Rodrik, 2008) due to the importance
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of several cultural and institutional diversities shaping national preferences.
The examples discussed by Rodrik cover such general areas as contract en-
forcement, entrepreneurship, trade openness and macroeconomic stability. It
is argued that in those areas best practices are better avoided. The legal sys-
tems, for instance, are very idiosyncratic to the country, so that what may be
considered a rational behaviour in a court could, yield undesired outcomes in
another. It is also observed that the best performers on international trade
have never been listed among the typical free trader, while free trade was a
very recommended best practice. Having observed the gap between what the
institutional setting is expected to deliver and the real world where policy-
makers everyday operate, it is urged to rely on a second best rather than ﬁrst
best institutions and practices. Is then education a ﬁeld where best practices
should be advocated or avoided?
3 An example: University education
“Most knowledge is a global public good” (Stiglitz, 1999 p.310) and this is
why at least some education is publicly supplied. In so far as university is
linked to the production and transmission of knowledge, it is a candidate ﬁt
to contribute an example. University education in Europe is regulated by
the Bologna Process, which started in 1999 with 29 participating countries,
and today counts 46 members. The system is based on the open method of
coordination, a new way of policy-making in the EU, mainly based on vol-
untary participation, benchmarking and peer review. Standardization has
introduced the Bachelor and Master structure of studies with the European
Credit Transfer &Accumulation System (ECTS), the National Qualiﬁcation
Frameworks (NQF) for curricula, the Diploma supplement (DS) describing
the achievements and grades, as well as endeavours to implement best prac-
tices, such as Quality assurance, by soft pressure through naming and sham-
ing rather than inﬂicting sanctions and ﬁnes.
The implementation of the Bologna process on the part of countries that
had a diﬀerent organization has meant not only re-organizational costs, but
also many diﬃculties among its stakeholders in the ways the new system was
explained and understood. The obvious advantage was to build up a more
homogeneous education system, easier to compare and assess across countries
and meant towards fostering student, and eventually labour, mobility. Ten
years later, the university system displays apparently the same structure
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but it seems to yield still very diﬀerent results. The following ﬁgures, all
quoted from the latest Eurydice Report (2007) and describing the situation
of tertiary education, may help illustrate the point.
The ﬁrst observation is that, while it is true that richer countries tend to
spend more per student in tertiary education than poorer countries, the ratio
varies considerably across them: given a similar income, Sweden spends much
more than the UK, and Finland more than Italy, while Ireland and Cyprus
with very diﬀerent GDP levels spend nearly the same.
Figure 3: Yearly expenditure per student in tertiary education and per capita
GDP in 000 EUR at PPP
Source: Eurostat/Eurydice
This information is conﬁrmed by looking at total expenditure in tertiary
education as a share of GDP, irrespective of whether it is public or private.
Figure 4 shows that not only Scandinavian countries (especially Denmark,
Finland and Sweden) present a share well above EU27 average, but also
Cyprus and Poland do so, while Romania, Malta, Italy and Estonia exhibit
the least ﬁgures for public expenditure on GDP. There does not seem to be
a straightforward clue to explain the picture.
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Figure 4: Expenditure in tertiary public and private education institutions
in % of GDP, ISCED 5&6 Year 2003
A more impressive representation emerges if only public expenditure is
taken into account. Figure 5 shows that only Scandinavian countries seem to
believe in public tertiary education. Interesting enough, Turkey ranks higher
than the EU27 average, probably as a consequence of the age structure of its
population.
Figure 5: Figure 5. Total public expenditure for tertiary education in % of
GDP, ISCED 5&6 Year 2003
A small public expenditure may be due to a small government budget,
but the high variability of public expenditure for tertiary education as a
share of total public expenditure is unlikely to fully support this hypothesis.
While Scandinavian countries still rank highest and Italy, Malta and Romania
lowest, Figure 6 shows that for other countries the rank does not seem to be
consistent with that of Figure 5.
The overall picture is completed by looking at the student/instructor
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Figure 6: Total public expenditure for tertiary education in % of total public
expenditure, ISCED 5&6
ratio (Figure 7). Again Turkey and the EU27 show similar ﬁgures (a little
more than 15 students per instructor) while those countries who previously
had shown a smaller-than-average expenditure, not surprisingly, now exhibit
a higher-than-average ratio. Yet, this can hardly be seen as an eﬃciency
indicator.
Figure 7: Student/instructors ratio in tertiary public and private education,
ISCED 5&6 Year 2003/4
A detailed country by country comparison taking into account the share,
age proﬁle and gender of the students in tertiary education is shown in Figure
8 where heterogeneity is the word representing the picture at best. The only
common feature is that in the vast majority of the EU member states, at a
younger age, girls undertake tertiary education more than boys. Attendance
and age proﬁle widely diﬀer, though.
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Figure 8: Education participation per age and sex at ISCED 5-6 level in
2003/4
Source: Eurostat/Eurydice Figure B9 page 49. Red dots: female. White dots:
males. Blue line: total.
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No matter the recent move towards a more similar system following the
Bologna process, huge disparities in tertiary education still exist. A few
words on the Italian situation cannot refrain from underlying that in Italy
the expenditure per student in tertiary education is much lower than that
of countries with a comparable GDP, the expenditure for tertiary education
on GDP as well as on total public expenditure, whether or not only public,
is lower than EU average, while the student/instructor ratio is higher than
average. Nevertheless, this would be good news if one could claim that the
public funds employed in education are eﬃciently spent.
How do we measure such a basic concept as economic eﬃciency in the
provision of public goods and in the public production in general? In the
absence of a reliable price vector, other indicators have often been employed.
For education PISA scores are often used. For tertiary education many in-
dicators have been proposed and used, none of which unquestionably reveals
extraordinary eﬀectiveness in providing tertiary education, nor prominent
eﬃciency in resource savings.
4 Conclusions
The paper has questioned the anticipated government downsizing as an ex-
pected result of globalization. Also the occurrence of a more homogeneous
world had been less evident than anticipated, to the point that in many cases
standardization and best practices have had to be imposed, not always suc-
cessfully. Due to globalization, public administration has been subject to
twists and turns and has faced the challenge with dissimilar results, whose
thoroughly assessment resides outside the scope of the paper. Tertiary edu-
cation aimed at supplying knowledge, a global public good provided by local
government as well as by the private sector, exempliﬁes the problems and
the complexities common to a fair share of the production through public
means.
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